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THE British government knew there was a public health risk attached to BSE,
but tried to hide it. That was the resounding conclusion of almost
three-quarters of people polled on 30 March this year by ICM, one of Britain鈥檚
biggest polling organisations. And more than 80 per cent also believed that the
government had only taken action when forced to do so. Back then, at the height
of the BSE-CJD scare, 80 per cent of people said that ministers were more
concerned with party politics than the wellbeing of consumers. Most of the
people polled also said that they did not trust the objectivity of the
scientific advice given to government.

Aaron Wildawsky, one of the leading modern thinkers on the culture of risk
perception, would probably have seen the recent BSE scare as a classic example
of a problem arising out of irrational fears. In a typically provocative book,
But Is It True? A Citizen鈥檚 Guide to Environmental Health and Safety,
published after his death in 1994, Wildawsky claimed that fears about
environmental risks are always exaggerated. A sober look at the scientific
evidence, he argued, normally reveals that there is little cause for alarm.

But if policy makers are to deal with issues such as BSE effectively, they
need more than scientific analysis. They need to know how ordinary people
perceive risks and cope with them. Long-standing research reveals that risks are
assessed according to factors such as whether they are voluntarily taken,
whether the potential harm is immediate or long-term, how much information is
available about the particular risk, and whether there are regulations and
safeguards in place.

With all that in mind, earlier this year we set out to find out more about
why and how individuals respond to various risks.

We interviewed 210 people in Norwich, selected according to where they
lived, so that the group contained people with various incomes, occupations,
ages and standards of education.

First, we wanted to re-examine the idea, proposed more than 10 years ago,
that some dangers are almost universally feared, whereas others are not. We also
aimed to test the established notion that people interpret risks in coherent but
very different ways depending on how they look at the world.

We chose to investigate 13 common risks (sunbathing, food colouring, genetic
engineering, nuclear power, mugging, home accidents, ozone depletion, car
driving, microwave ovens, AIDS, war, terrorism and alcoholic drinks) because
they can all be fitted into a particular 鈥減sychological space鈥�. In other words,
it is possible to categorise these risks according to two variables. The first
concerns to what extent possible harmful effects are delayed and have
catastrophic potential. And the second, whether the risk is imposed fairly or
not: whether it is unavoidable or voluntary, whether victims are informed about
the possible dangers to which they are exposed, and whether there are mechanisms
in place to monitor their health and compensate them or their relatives if they
become ill, or die (see
`Psychological space鈥�).

Previous studies suggest that the most acceptable risks are those deemed to
be self-imposed or with immediate impact. This is exactly what we found.
Microwave ovens, food colouring and alcohol were all seen as not particularly
risky. 鈥淐atastrophic鈥� themes such as war, genetic engineering, ozone loss and
nuclear power, however, were rated as highly risky (see
`Perceived risk鈥�).

Sense of dread

We also found that people most fear risks that they perceive as unacceptable
to society and harmful to the environment as a whole. The people in our study
were particularly concerned about risks, such as ozone depletion, that they
considered to be harmful to future generations. They also often used the term
鈥渄read鈥� to describe risks that they considered involuntary, unfair or highly
likely to kill or permanently injure people.

Other studies have found that people are less concerned about a risk if they
are well informed. So we were surprised when our respondants said that people
are particularly afraid of risks of which they are well informed but still
exposed to. Detailed follow-up interviews helped us to reconcile the findings.
The participants in our study did demand more information because they said that
knowledge gave them choice and more control over their exposure to risks.
However, they also had an extraordinary lack of trust in official sources of
information. A common view was that information is withheld deliberately and
that when it is given out, this is done in a limited way and with a view to
manipulating people rather than giving them control. The dramatic reduction in
beef consumption in the weeks following March鈥檚 BSE-CJD scare鈥攄espite
official assurances that it was safe to eat鈥攑owerfully reflected this
feeling.

So who do people turn to for reassurance under such circumstances? We came up
with some interesting findings. Whatever the risk, they were more likely to
trust the opinions of their nearest and dearest than the views of officials.
Family and friends were seen as the most reliable sources of information,
followed closely by environmental groups, which people see as independent of
government and commercial biases. Doctors and scientists were also considered
quite trustworthy, but trade unions, religious organisations, the media,
companies and government all scored badly (see `
Who we trust鈥�,).

McDonald鈥檚 was smart when it stopped using British beef in the weeks
following the BSE-CJD scare. It could see that customers were influenced by
their families and friends, not by government announcements or scientific
assurances, and that it could win public trust by taking action to reduce the
perceived risk. But organisations and officials hoping to ride the tide of
public opinion should beware. In detailed interviews, we found that people are
conscious that there is bias inherent in all sources of information, and that
they interpret it according to the characteristics of the source.

World view

Another difficulty facing policy makers is that the general patterns of how
people perceive and deal with risk reflect a complex set of individual world
views and social reference points. In 1994, Richard Eiser, professor of
psychology at the University of Exeter, coined the term 鈥渁ttitudinal
certainties鈥� to identify packages of beliefs that are reinforced by society to
the extent that they become collective convictions. From time to time, he
argued, disturbing or unexpected events lead to a rethink and new 鈥渃ertainties鈥�
emerge. This kind of study is part of culture theory, a branch of sociology
which says that people鈥檚 outlooks on all sorts of issues, including risk, are
shaped by the society in which they live.

Using the framework of culture theory, people can be categorised into four
groups: fatalists, individualists, hierarchists and egalitarians鈥攁ll of
whom perceive risk in different but predictable ways (see
`Cultural
诲颈蝉辫辞蝉颈迟颈辞苍蝉鈥�). Their various views of nature seem to play an
important role in shaping these perceptions.

According to research done in the late 1980s by Wildawsky and former
colleagues at the University of California at Berkeley, fatalists tend to see
nature as a lottery, individualists as inherently resilient, hierarchists as
essentially robust but vulnerable if abused, and egalitarians perceive it as
very fragile.

In theory, we should have been able to predict the responses of individuals
in our survey once we knew their particular cultural dispositions. In practice,
the results were more complex. Although we found a general trend towards the
four distinct patterns of risk perception, only 20 per cent of people fitted
clearly into the categories of fatalist, individualist, hierarchist and
egalitarian.

Having identified these 鈥渆xtreme鈥� respondents using a series of specially
designed agree/disagree statements such as 鈥淚 have often been treated unfairly鈥�,
we were, however, surprised at just how closely their perceptions of risk fitted
our predictions. We invited small groups to discuss their views in detail and
found a remarkable consistency of ideas expressed by people of the same cultural
disposition and distinct differences between each of the four groups.

People with high 鈥渇atalist鈥� scores tended to have a great sense of dread
about a whole range of social and environmental threats, but felt powerless to
influence society in any way.

Those with high 鈥渆galitarian鈥� scores despised war, feared genetic
engineering, wanted to save the ozone layer and scrap nuclear power. They also
disliked authoritarian structures, distrusted expertise, and were strongly in
favour of decision procedures which relied on participation by members of the
public.

People with high 鈥渉ierarchist鈥� scores were most concerned about social issues
such as mugging and terrorism and felt that environmental problems could be left
to experts. They preferred the 鈥渟oft law鈥� of guidance, advice, education and
training, so long as they perceived the risks as clear and fair. Otherwise they
looked for tough regulatory measures.

The 鈥渋ndividualists鈥� were not much bothered about the environment and felt
that issues such as nuclear power and ozone depletion had been blown right out
of proportion. They thought that a system based on financial incentives and
compensation could deal adequately with environmental and health risks.

Acceptable risk

Both individualists and hierarchists were prepared to tolerate risks provided
that they were dealt with in the ways that they deemed appropriate. But they
joined the egalitarians in condemning risks where regulatory mechanisms and
evaluative principles were not in place.

Egalitarians, hierarchists and fatalists were all influenced by their
perception about the degree of 鈥渦nnaturalness鈥� of a given risk. Hierarchists,
for example, despite their predisposition to trust experts, were worried about
genetic engineering, microwaves and food colourings even though these
technologies have been sanctioned by scientists. This reflects their opposition
to 鈥渢ampering鈥� with the food chain or with the genetic make-up of living beings,
especially of humans.

So, risk is a multidimensional concept. The statistical probability of harm
as determined by an 鈥渆xpert鈥� is but one element used by the public to evaluate
potential dangers. Risk perception is a sophisticated, complex process which
makes sense in relation to an individual鈥檚 experience and view of the world. The
public does not always know best鈥攂ut nor do scientists or politicians.